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In addition, Stewart and Marshall recognized the dangers in
compelling disclosure of confidential news sources. Informants
have been essential to the gathering of information and ultimate
dissemination of news of public interest. Warrants could force
reporters to reveal the identity of these sources even though
they may be unrelated to the evidence sought. Future sources
of important-but secret information, fearful of having their
identity revealed, may be reluctant to confide in the press.
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens discussed
another dimension of the case. He emphasized the private
nature of the evidence sought and questioned the sufficiency of
the reasonable belief standard when the police make an
unannounced search of property belonging to a non-suspect.
Since the warrant clause of the fourth amendment was not
framed to protect private papers and at the same time does not
define probable cause, Stevens stressed the need to distinguish
between evidence of a personal nature and instruments of a
crime. He recognized that there should be probable cause that
the defendant committed a crime and that the defendant is
likely to destroy any evidence related to it. If a lower probable
cause standard is employed and personal matters are seized,
reputations could be injured and privacy invaded. Only the
subpoena process affords a prior opportunity to challenge the
search and therefore, to prevent access to private materials.
However, the majority did not agree that a subpoena procedure should be required where an unannounced search is
conducted on the property of a newspaper not suspected of
committing a crime. A warrant is not barred in such a case and
a special exemption from searches and seizures for the press
was rejected.
-Charles Chester

A Suit of Armor
On March 28, 1978 the Supreme Court reinforced the common law principle of judicial immunity from civil suit. In a 5-3
decision the Court in Stump u. Sparkman, 98 S.Ct. 1099
(1978), concluded that an Indiana Circuit Court judge who authorized the sterilization of a fifteen year old girl in an ex parte
proceeding, was immune from civil suit under 42 U.S.C.§1983.
The circumstances preceding the application of the doctrine
are shocking. In 1975 Linda and Leo Sparkman sought medical
advice as to why they could not conceive a child. At this point
Linda Spitler Sparkman first learned that she had been
sterilized at the age of fifteen. Her mother, Ora Spitler
McFarlin, had petitioned the Circuit Court of DeKalb County,
Indiana to order the sterilization of her daughter. Mrs. McFarlin had alleged that without her knowledge and consent, her
daughter, Linda, dated and stayed overnight with various
young men. Mrs. McFarlin directed her attorney, Warren G.
Sunday, to prepare an affidavit which stated that "Linda was
,somewhat retarded' although she attended public schools and
had been passed along with other children in her age level."
Sparkman v. McFarlin 552 F.2d 172, 173 (7th Cir. 1977). The
petition and affidavit were presented to Judge Stump of the Circuit Court who issued the requested order without appointing
a guardian ad litem to represent Linda's interests, without
holding an evidentiary hearing, without providing Linda with
notice of the petition, and without even filing the order in the
DeKalb County Circuit Court. The only "notice" Linda

received during this period of time was that she was to enter the
hospital for an appendectomy.
Linda and Leo Sparkman brought an action seeking
damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§1983, 1985 (3) contending
that the actions of the defendants, Ora E. McFarlin, Warren G.
Sunday, Esq., Dr. John Hines, and Judge Harold Stump, violated her constitutional rights by sterilizing her or causing her
to be sterilized. Pendent state claims were attached for assault
and battery and medical malpractice. Leo Sparkman asserted a
pendent claim for loss of potential fatherhood. The District
Court, in granting the defendants' motions to dismiss, held that
no federal action would lie against any of the defendants
because Judge Stump, the only state agent, was absolutely immune from suit pursuant to the doctrine of judicial immunity.
Sparkman u. McFarlin, Civil No. F 75-129 (N.D. Ind. May 13,
1976). "Whether or not Judge Stump's approval of the petition
may in retrospect appear to have been premised on an erroneous view of the law, Judge Stump surely had jurisdiction to
consider the petition and act thereon." 98 S.Ct. at 1104.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the judgment of the Circuit Court and held that Judge Stump
failed to act within his jurisdiction when he approved the petition to have Linda Spitler sterilized. The Court reasoned that
although IND. CODE 33-4-4-3 confers original jurisdiction in all
cases of law and equity, it does not cloak a Circuit Court judge
with blanket immunity. The Court found that there was no statutory basis for Judge Stump's approval of the petition. In addition, Judge Stump was acting unlawfully even if he was creating an innovative legal remedy to meet changing social conditions, an argument made in support of the broad discretion
exerciseable by a judge. A judge may not use his judicial power
"to order extreme irreversible remedies such as sterilization in
situations where the legislative branch of government has indicated that they are inappropriate." 552 F.2d at 176.
Of significance is the fact that the Court of Appeals found the
actions taken to be an illegitimate exercise of judicial common
law power due to failure to comply with elementary principles
of procedural due process. 552 F.2d at 176.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals and found that Judge Stump was immune from liability
for damages even if his approval of the petition for sterilization
was in error. The concepts of jurisdiction and the judicial act
requirements were found to be determinative of the extent of
the doctrine of judicial immunity. The Court noted that the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals misconstrued the doctrine.
Because Judge Stump had performed a judicial act that was not
in clear absence of all jurisdiction, he was thus entitled to judicial immunity. 98 S.Ct.at 1106.
The Supreme court examined the statutory authority vested
in an Indiana Circuit Court Judge pursuant to IND.CODE33-44-3 (1976), which states:
Said Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all cases at law
and in equity whatsoever and in criminal cases and actions
for divorce, except where exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction is, or may be conferred by law upon other justices of the
peace...
Formerly, Indiana Circuit Court judges had the authority to authorize sterilization but only upon institutionalized persons.
Ch. 227, §1, 1951 Indiana Act 649; Chap. 244, §§1-3, 1937
Indiana Acts 1164; Chap. 312, §§2-6, 1931 Indiana Acts 116;
Chap. 241, §§1-6, 1927 Indiana Acts 713 (repealed 1974). The
Supreme Court did not consider it significant that the authority
to sterilize had been repealed. What was significant, however,

FORUM

was the fact that at the time there "was no Indiana statute...
prohibiting a Circuit Court, a court of general jurisdiction, from
considering a petition of the type presented to Judge Stump."
98 S.Ct. at 1105.
The express statutory authority had been for the sterilization
of an institutionalized individual. Despite that fact, it did not
follow that a court of general jurisdiction had no power to act
upon a petition for sterilization of a minor in the custody of her
parents minus statutory authority. See Kemp u Kemp 43 Cal.
App. 3d 758, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1974), Smith u. Command 231
Mich. 409, 294 N.W. 140 (1925). Therefore, a Circuit Court
judge of a court of general jurisdiction has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of any case before him provided there is no statute or case prohibiting such jurisdiction.
A related proposition is a case where the judge failed to observe a statute or case law limitation on his judicial power yet he
was not deprived of the defense of judicial immunity. The opin
ion in the case of A.L. u. G.R.H., 325 N.E.2d 501 (Ind. App.
1975) did not indicate that a circuit judge was without jurisdiction to rule upon the parent's petition to sterilize their child.
"The clear implication of the opinion is that when presented
with such a petition, the Circuit Judge should deny it on its
merits rather than dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction." 98 S.Ct. at
1106. Rather than acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction,
Judge Stump exceeded it in the disposition of the case before
him.
The Supreme Court failed to address the question of why
one who acts in excess of his jurisdiction is provided with judi
cial immunity. The Court did, however, recognize the
importance to the administration of justice that a judge be free
to act without fear of personal reprisal. 98 S.Ct. at 1108,
quoting from Bradley u. Fisher 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 355 (1872).
Judges must be free from harassing, expensive and time consuming law suits. Piersonu. Ray. 386 U.S. 547 (1967); McCray
v. Maryland 456 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1972).
The respondents argued that Stump's approval of the peti
tion was not a judicial act "because it was not given a docket
number, was not placed on file with the clerk's office, and was
approved in an ex porte proceeding without notice to the
minor, without a hearing and without the appointment of a
guardian ad litem." 98 S.Ct. at 1106. In concluding that the
Judge did perform a judicial act, the Court focused on whether
his act was a function normally performed by a judge and
whether the parties dealt with him in his judicial capacity.
Certainly Ora McFarlin had presented the petition to Judge
Stump because he was a circuit court judge, 98 S.Ct. at 1108,
and consideration of a petition relating to the affairs of a minor
is the type of action judges are normally called upon to review in their official capacity, 98 S.Ct. at 1108. This is the subjective test that must be met for an ordinary act to be labeled a
judicial act.
The dissenting opinions in Stump suggest that the Judge's
actions did not constitute a judicial act. Justices Stewart,
Marshall, and Powell failed to convince the majority that
Stump's actions were not those "normally performed by a
Judge." At 98 S.Ct. 1109, the dissent states:
it is not clear to me whether the Court means that a Judge
normally is asked to approve a mother's decision to have her
child given a surgical treatment or that a Judge "normally" is
asked to approve a mother's wish to have her daughter sterilized.
Merely because Stump was asked to approve a petition
because he was a circuit court judge did not make that approval
a judicial act. The dissent reasoned that in determining what

constitutes a judicial act, factors such as whether the proceeding presents a case or controversy, adversaries, and
decision making, are important. In the absence of any of these
"normal attributes" of a judicial proceeding there is no judicial
act. 98 S.Ct. at 1110.
Justice Powell, in dissent, emphasized what he thought to be
the central feature of the case: petitioner's preclusion of any
possibility for the vindication of the respondent's rights elsewhere in the judicial system. 98 S.Ct. at 1112. He argued that a
judicial act is one that does not preclude a party's right to resort to appellate or other judicial remedies. Judge Stump
should have been denied judicial immunity when his unjudicial
conduct prevented Linda Sparkman from resorting to
appellate or other judicial remedies otherwise available.
While bolstering the concept of judicial immunity, the Court,
in an aside, provided a history lesson which served to justify the
use of the doctrine. The decision explained that the first
Supreme court decision on judicial immunity held that judges
were not liable in civil actions for their judicial acts even when
such acts were in excess of their jurisdiction. Randall v.
Brigham 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868). Four years later in
Bradley u. Fisher, supra, the Court held that "judges of courts
are not liable to civil action for their judicial acts even when
such acts were in excess of their jurisdiction and are alleged to
have been done maliciously or corruptly." 80 U.S. at 337.
While Bradley u. Fisher was being argued before the court,
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Section 1, now
codified as 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1976), was enacted to protect
black citizens from organized racist movements and to provide
a remedy for injuries that were occuring at the hands of federal
and state law enforcement officials during the Reconstruction.
See CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong, Ist Sess. 653 (1871).
The present Section 1983 provides:
Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects
or causes to be subject, any citizen of the U.S., or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution
and Laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress.

In Pierson v. Ray, supra, a group of black clergymen brought
suit against a police Court Judge for false arrest and violation of
Section 1983. The clergymen had attempted to use a "white
only" waiting room in a Jackson, Mississippi bus terminal and
were arrested and convicted of violating a state breach of the
peace statute. MISS. CODE ANN. 62087.5 (Supp. 1971). The
majority found the Police Court Judge absolutely immune from
suit under Section 1983, and based its decision on the belief
that judicial immunity was a well established principle of common law. Further, the Court found the doctrine firmly entrenched within the legislative history of Section 1 of the Civil
Rights Act. 386 U.S. at 553-554.
Justice Douglas severely criticized the majority's reliance on
the legislative history of Section I of the Civil Rights Act. 386
U.S. at 547, 559-563. Douglas suggested that Congress recognized and accepted the fact that State Court Judges would not
be immune from actions based on Section 1 of the Act. The
maladministration of justice was due to the impartial
administration of law and equity and providing broad immunity
would only serve to foster this problem. 386 U.S. at 559.

However, Pierson v. Ray, supra, has been the governing rule
despite the questionable legislative record. While courts have
qualified the immunity doctrine with respect to executive, administrative, and other quasi judicial officersi, they have consistently upheld judicial immunity as prohibiting Section 1983 suits
against judges.
-Roxane N. Sokolove

'See Schuer v. Rhodes 416 U.S. 232 (1974) where personal representatives of the
estates of students who died in the Kent State tragedy brought suit under 42
U.S.C. §1983 against the Governor of Ohio. Chief Justice Berger, after finding
the suit not barred by the 11th Amendment, held that state officers had a qualified, not absolute immunity, the degree of qualification "being dependent upon
the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the officer and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is
sought to be based." 416 U.S. at 247.

Recent
Decisions
Complete with Accessories
The Court of Appeals, in the case of State v. Williamson, 282
Md. 100, 382 A.2d 588 (1978), has held that an accessory before
the fact may be indicted and convicted of first degree murder
under the form of indictment prescribed in MD. ANN. CODE,
Art 27, §616(a),' and that the indictment need not distinguish
between principals and accessories in order for the conviction
to be upheld.
Joyce Marcine Williamson was convicted by a Baltimore
County jury of first degree murder and other charges arising
from the death of her husband outside of their home on
October 5, 1975. According to the findings of the jury, defendant Williamson hired one Lawrence Merrick to murder her
husband; Merrick subsequently beat Mr. Williamson to death
in a parked car in the driveway of his home on the date in
question. The evidence indicated that following a period of
negotiation with someone who ultimately refused to commit
the murder defendant, with the assistance of her brother, then

'The section in question reads as follows: "Where death penalty not sought.
Except as provided in subsection (b), in any indictment for murder or manslaughter, or for being an accessory thereto, it shall not be necessary to set forth the
manner or means of death. It shall be sufficient to use a formula substantially to
the following effect: That A.B., on the ... day of ... nineteen hundred and ... at the
county aforesaid, feloniously (wilfully and of deliberately premeditated malice
aforethought) did kill (and murder) C.D. against the peace, government and
dignity of the State."

Photo by J.J.R.
arranged for the hiring of Merrick. There was, however, no
evidence adduced at trial to indicate that defendant assisted
Merrick in any way on the night of the murder, or that she was
in a position to aid him in any way, or even ,that she was awake
at the time of the murder. Concluding that there was no
constructive presence of the defendant at the scene of the
crime, the Court of Special Appeals held that the evidence was
insufficient to show that Williamson was a principal in the
murder of her husband and reversed the conviction. The issue
then presented by the state to the Court of Appeals on a writ of
certiorari was whether a defendant can be convicted of first
degree murder when he has hired someone else to commit the
murder and is therefore an accessory before the fact.
The Court of Appeals held that the abbreviated form of indictment for murder privided for in MD. ANN. CODE, Art. 27,
§616 (a) allows for a conviction of murder when proof of either
accessoryship or principalship is adduced, and thereby reversed the Court of Special Appeals.
At common law, distinctions were drawn between accessories and principals for reasons which even today remain
unclear. A popular suggestion has been made that the doctrine
of accessoryship was created by early common law judges in an
effort to alleviate, in certain cases, the severity of the rule that
all felonies were punishable by death. An accessory before the
fact is one who procures, counsels or commands the commission of the criminal offense but is absent from the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission. A principal may be of two
degrees: a principal in the first degree being one who commits

